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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________________ 
 
SMITH, Chief Judge. 
 
This case presents a question of statutory 
interpretation: does 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3) allow debtors 
to orally dispute a debt’s validity? 
It also presents a question of stare decisis: should our 
en banc Court resolve a circuit conflict by overturning a 
three-decades-old panel decision which has been eroded 
by intervening Supreme Court authority? 
Because we answer both questions affirmatively, we 
will overrule Graziano v. Harrison’s contrary 
interpretation of § 1692g(a)(3) and affirm. 
I 
A 
The statutory interpretation question arises from 
language which appears in the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p (FDCPA). The 
FDCPA protects against abusive debt collection practices 
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by imposing restrictions and obligations on third-party 
debt collectors. See §§ 1692b–1692j. 
This case concerns one of those requirements: that debt 
collectors send debtors a letter notifying them of their right 
to dispute the debt. See § 1692g. Section 1692g(a) 
specifies five things the letter, often called a “validation 
notice,” must include: 
(1) the amount of the debt; 
(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt 
is owed; 
(3) a statement that unless the consumer, 
within thirty days after receipt of the notice, 
disputes the validity of the debt, or any 
portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to 
be valid by the debt collector; 
(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies 
the debt collector in writing within the thirty-
day period that the debt, or any portion 
thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will 
obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a 
judgment against the consumer and a copy of 
such verification or judgment will be mailed 
to the consumer by the debt collector; and 
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(5) a statement that, upon the consumer’s 
written request within the thirty-day period, 
the debt collector will provide the consumer 
with the name and address of the original 
creditor, if different from the current creditor. 
The question presented is whether the letter must 
require all disputes to be in writing, or whether 
§ 1692g(a)(3) permits oral disputes. 
Before answering that question, it is instructive to 
examine other protections the FDCPA provides when 
debts are disputed. For instance, § 1692g(b) demands that: 
If the consumer notifies the debt collector in 
writing within the thirty-day period described 
in subsection (a) that the debt, or any portion 
thereof, is disputed, or that the consumer 
requests the name and address of the original 
creditor, the debt collector shall cease 
collection of the debt, or any disputed portion 
thereof, until the debt collector obtains 
verification of the debt or a copy of a 
judgment, or the name and address of the 
original creditor, and a copy of such 
verification or judgment, or name and 
address of the original creditor, is mailed to 
the consumer by the debt collector. 
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In addition, debt collectors are prohibited from reporting 
disputed debts to credit agencies without noting the fact of 
a dispute. See § 1692e(8) (prohibiting collectors from 
“[c]ommunicating or threatening to communicate to any 
person credit information which is known or which should 
be known to be false, including the failure to communicate 
that a disputed debt is disputed”). Finally, collectors 
seeking payments on multiple debts owed by the same 
debtor cannot apply a payment to any disputed debts. See 
§ 1692h (“If any consumer owes multiple debts and makes 
any single payment to any debt collector with respect to 
such debts, such debt collector may not apply such 
payment to any debt which is disputed by the consumer 
and, where applicable, shall apply such payment in 
accordance with the consumer’s directions.”). 
B 
We first considered the import of § 1692g(a)(3) in 
Graziano. See 950 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1991). There, a three-
judge panel expressed “the view that, given the entire 
structure of section 1692g, subsection (a)(3) must be read 
to require that a dispute, to be effective, must be in 
writing”: 
Adopting [a contrary] reading of the statute 
would thus create a situation in which, upon 
the debtor’s non-written dispute, the debt 
collector would be without any statutory 
ground for assuming that the debt was valid, 
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but nevertheless would not be required to 
verify the debt or to advise the debtor of the 
identity of the original creditor and would be 
permitted to continue debt collection efforts. 
We see no reason to attribute to Congress an 
intent to create so incoherent a system. We 
also note that there are strong reasons to 
prefer that a dispute of a debt collection be in 
writing: a writing creates a lasting record of 
the fact that the debt has been disputed, and 
thus avoids a source of potential conflicts. 
Id. at 112; accord Caprio v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery 
Grp., LLC, 709 F.3d 142, 148 (3d Cir. 2013) (“In 
Graziano v. Harrison, we specifically concluded that 
‘subsection (a)(3), like subsections (a)(4) and (a)(5), 
contemplates that any dispute, to be effective, must be in 
writing.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Graziano, 950 F.3d 
at 112)). 
C 
In the matter now before us, Maureen Riccio fell 
behind on payments to M-Shell Consumer Oils. Sentry 
Credit bought the debt and sought to collect on it. So it 
sent Riccio a letter containing the following notification: 
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Compl. Ex. A. 
Riccio sued,1 alleging the letter violated § 1692g(a)(3) 
by providing a debtor with multiple options for contacting 
Sentry Credit rather than explicitly requiring any dispute 
be in writing. App. 53-54. Sentry Credit agreed that it had 
to require Riccio to dispute the debt in writing under 
 
1 The FDCPA authorizes private actions and imposes strict 
liability for violations, with statutory damages up to $1000 
and potential fee-shifting. See § 1692k. 
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Graziano, but the company viewed its letter as complying 
with that requirement. It therefore moved for judgment on 
the pleadings, and the District Court granted the motion. 
See 2018 WL 638748, at *4-6 (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 2018). 
Riccio timely appealed. The District Court exercised 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review statutory interpretation 
questions de novo. See United States v. Hodge, 948 F.3d 
160, 162 (3d Cir. 2020). 
II 
As noted, a panel of this Court previously concluded 
§ 1692g(a)(3) requires that “any dispute, to be effective, 
must be in writing.” Graziano, 950 F.2d at 112. Yet reading 
the statutory text with fresh eyes—and more importantly, 
with the past three decades of Supreme Court statutory-
interpretation caselaw—we think § 1692g(a)(3) permits 
oral disputes.  
A 
We begin by looking at § 1692g(a)(3) itself. That 
provision refers only to “disputes,” without specifying oral 
or written. Used generally, the word fairly encompasses 
both forms of communication. See, e.g., Dispute, Oxford 
English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) (“To discuss, debate, or 
argue (a question); . . . To argue against, contest, 
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controvert; To call in question or contest the validity or 
accuracy of a statement, etc., or the existence of a thing.”). 
We must read § 1692g as a whole. Subsection (a)(3) 
merely calls for “the consumer” to “dispute[] the validity 
of the debt” in order to rebut the statutory presumption of 
validity. But (a)(4) requires “the consumer [to] notif[y] the 
debt collector in writing” before forcing the collector to 
mail documentation verifying the debt. (emphasis added). 
And (a)(5) similarly demands that the consumer make a 
“written request within the thirty-day period” to compel 
the collector to “provide the consumer with the name and 
address of the original creditor, if different from the 
current creditor.” (emphasis added). Subsection (b) then 
echoes (a)(4) and (5), obliging collectors to “cease 
collection . . . until . . . obtain[ing] verification” if the 
debtor “notifie[d] the debt collector” of a dispute or 
requested the creditor’s identity “in writing.” (emphasis 
added). That intra-section variation strongly signals that 
§ 1692g permits oral disputes. “We refrain from 
concluding here that the differing language in the [various] 
subsections has the same meaning in each.” Russello v. 
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983). 
We must also consider the entirety of the FDCPA. Like 
§ 1692g(a)(3)—but unlike (a)(4), (a)(5), and (b)—
§§ 1692e(8) and 1692h also discuss “dispute[s]” without 
specifying a method of communication. That inter-section 
variation amplifies the variation within § 1692g and, in 
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our view, refutes Riccio’s suggestion that Congress 
inadvertently omitted a writing requirement from 
§ 1692g(a)(3). “[W]here Congress includes particular 
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another 
section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that 
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate 
inclusion or exclusion.” Russello, 464 U.S. at 23 
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim 
Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)). 
Finally, we consider one of the most venerable of our 
interpretive canons: the rule against surplusage. See 
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 574 (1995) (“[T]he 
Court will avoid a reading which renders some words 
altogether redundant.”); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (using this canon to 
interpret U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2). Collectively, the 
text of § 1692g(a)(3), (a)(4), and (b) signifies that if a 
debtor makes the effort to dispute the debt in writing, the 
collector must immediately stop collecting, verify the 
debt, and respond. Yet if the debtor merely disputes the 
debt orally, the collector can continue attempts to collect 
the debt. It will, though, eventually have to prove the 
debt’s validity. 
Injecting a writing requirement into (a)(3) effectively 
strikes that provision from the statute. It is a truism that if 
a debt isn’t presumed valid, the debt collector must 
eventually verify it. Subsection (a)(3) merely restates that 
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point: if the debtor disputes the debt, the collector must 
verify it at some point down the road. But (a)(4) and (b) 
demand that if the debtor disputes the debt in writing, the 
collector must prove its validity immediately. So if every 
dispute must be conveyed in writing, collectors must prove 
every debt immediately—no collector can ever count on 
its future ability to prove a debt. Put differently, inserting 
a writing requirement into (a)(3) means that every dispute 
triggers (a)(4) and (b). That simply can’t be right. If every 
dispute triggers (a)(4) and (b), then (a)(3) has no 
independent effect. 
*      *      * 
The upshot: § 1692g(a)(3)’s plain meaning permits a 
debtor to dispute a debt orally. And when a “‘statute’s 
language is plain, the sole function of the courts’—at least 
where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—
‘is to enforce it according to its terms.’” Hartford 
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 
U.S. 1, 6 (2000) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair 
Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)). 
Riccio tries using this absurd-result exception to 
shoehorn a writing requirement into § 1692g(a)(3).2 But 
 
2 Riccio also uses United States v. American Trucking 
Associations, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940), to argue she need 
not show that permitting oral disputes would be absurd, 
just that it would be unreasonable. Simply put, that 
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that dog won’t hunt. “An absurd interpretation is one that 
‘defies rationality or renders the statute nonsensical and 
superfluous.’” Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone Mansion Rest. 
Inc., 902 F.3d 147, 152 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting United 
States v. Moreno, 727 F.3d 255, 259 (3d Cir. 2013)). As 
long as Congress could have any conceivable justification 
for a result—even if the result carries negative 
consequences—that result cannot be absurd. See United 
States v. Fontaine, 697 F.3d 221, 228 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(“[S]tandard interpretive doctrine . . . defines an ‘absurd 
result’ as an outcome so contrary to perceived social 
values that Congress could not have ‘intended’ it.” 
(quoting John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 
Harv. L. Rev. 2387, 2390 (2003))); Hanif v. Attorney Gen., 
694 F.3d 479, 487 (3d Cir. 2012); see also In re Visteon 
Corp., 612 F.3d 210, 234 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Virtually all 
laws would be absurd if judged by whether they 
accomplish a perfect solution to an underlying legislative 
concern.”). 
 
misrepresents the current state of the law. To depart from 
a statute’s plain meaning today, the text must dictate a 
result so unreasonable that it amounts to an absurdity. See 
Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 n.33 (1978); 
see also MORI Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 
503, 537-39 (2011) (detailing American Trucking 
Associations’s practical abrogation). 
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Reading § 1692g(a)(3) to permit oral disputes falls far 
short of the high bar this Court has set. In fact, allowing 
oral disputes makes sense: it provides debtors multiple 
methods to dispute debts while assigning various rights 
depending on the method.3 An oral dispute can still defeat 
the presumption of validity, still prevent collectors from 
reporting the debt without noting the dispute, and still 
preclude debt collectors holding multiple debts of the 
same debtor from applying a payment to the disputed debt. 
It just doesn’t force the debt collector to immediately stop, 
verify, and respond in the way the FDCPA requires if a 
dispute is in writing. That’s hardly absurd. If nothing else, 
it is easier to prove written disputes and therefore easier to 
enforce the additional protections that attach.4 
 
3 On this point, it bears noting that purposively reading the 
FDCPA underscores our textual conclusion. At bottom, 
expanding the ways a debtor can dispute a debt’s validity 
makes it easier for debtors to invoke its protections. So 
demanding written disputes not only flouts the FDCPA’s 
text—it also hoodwinks the Act’s purpose. 
4 Relatedly, at oral argument, Riccio’s counsel argued that 
permitting oral disputes would spawn conundrums over 
the “magic words” that distinguish a formal dispute from 
informal grumbling. Oral Argument at 3:16, 4:57 (Feb. 19, 
2020), https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/ 
audio/18-1463Ricciov.%20SentryCreditInc.mp3; see also 
id. at 6:05, 50:31. We think district courts are more than 
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Lest any doubt remains, Lamie v. United States Trustee 
should settle the matter. There, the Supreme Court refused 
to “read an absent word into [a] statute” despite “an 
apparent legislative drafting error” that rendered the 
statute “awkward, and even ungrammatical.” 540 U.S. 
526, 530-38 (2004). “With a plain, nonabsurd meaning in 
view, we need not proceed in this way,” the Court said, 
noting their “longstanding” “unwillingness to soften the 
import of Congress’ chosen words even if we believe the 
words lead to a harsh outcome.” Id. at 538. 
So too here. Even if we thought Congress inadvertently 
omitted a writing requirement from § 1692g(a)(3), and 
even if we thought permitting oral disputes precipitated an 
incoherent system, we must still recognize the validity of 
oral disputes based on § 1692g’s plain meaning. “If 
Congress enacted into law something different from what 
it intended, then it should amend the statute . . . . ‘It is 
beyond our province to rescue Congress from its drafting 
errors, and to provide for what we might think . . . is the 
preferred result.’” Id. at 542 (second omission in original) 
(quoting United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 68 
(1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)). 
 
 
capable of that linedrawing. In fact, they already do it 




Other courts have reached the same conclusion. The 
Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits reject a writing 
requirement, openly splitting with Graziano. See Clark v. 
Absolute Collection Serv., Inc., 741 F.3d 487, 490-91 (4th 
Cir. 2014) (per curiam); Hooks v. Forman, Holt, Eliades & 
Ravin, LLC, 717 F.3d 282, 285-86 (2d Cir. 2013); 
Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin. Inc., 430 F.3d 1078, 1080-81 
(9th Cir. 2005). And without noting the split, the First, 
Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have taken the same 
position. See Macy v. GC Servs. Ltd., 897 F.3d 747, 757-
58 (6th Cir. 2018); Evans v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., 
LLC, 889 F.3d 337, 347 n.6 (7th Cir. 2018); Sayles v. 
Advanced Recovery Sys., Inc., 865 F.3d 246, 249-50 (5th 
Cir. 2017); Brady v. Credit Recovery Co., 160 F.3d 64, 66-
67 (1st Cir. 1998). 
C 
In sum, we no longer think § 1692g(a)(3) requires 
written disputes. Simply put, “Congress did not write the 
statute that way.” United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 
773 (1979). Subsections (a)(4), (a)(5), and (b) command a 
written dispute; (a)(3) does not. “We would not presume 
to ascribe this difference to a simple mistake in 





The foregoing details our reasoning, and our 
disagreement with Graziano. Yet we must consider 
whether stare decisis justifies our upholding that 
precedent. “Stare decisis—in English, the idea that today’s 
Court should stand by yesterday’s decisions—is ‘a 
foundation stone of the rule of law.’” Kimble v. Marvel 
Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015) (quoting 
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 798 
(2014)). To be sure, stare decisis “is not an inexorable 
command,” but it is critical to “promote[] the evenhanded, 
predictable, and consistent development of legal 
principles, foster[] reliance on judicial decisions, and 
contribute[] to the actual and perceived integrity of the 
judicial process.” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 
(1991). In fact, sometimes it “means sticking to some 
wrong decisions.” Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2409. After all, “it 
is usually ‘more important that the applicable rule of law 
be settled than that it be settled right.’” Id. (quoting Burnet 
v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)). That’s especially true in 
statutory interpretation cases like this one, because 
Congress can correct unintended interpretations. See id. at 
2409-10. 
Before overruling its own precedent, the Supreme 
Court looks for “‘special justification[s]’ [] over and above 
the belief ‘that the precedent was wrongly decided.’” 
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Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2409 (quoting Halliburton Co. v. 
Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 266 (2014)). Those 
include “the quality of [the prior case]’s reasoning, the 
workability of the rule it established, its consistency with 
other related decisions, developments since the decision 
was handed down, and reliance on the decision.” Janus v. 
AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478-79 (2018). Though we, 
as a lower court, “play a different role in the federal 
system,” we join virtually every other Circuit in weighing 
those same considerations before overturning our own 
caselaw. Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 
871, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc); see also United States 
v. Sykes, 598 F.3d 334, 338 (7th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 564 U.S. 
1 (2011), overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. United 
States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015); Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 310 (2d Cir. 2007) (en banc); 
United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913, 918-19 (9th Cir. 
2007) (en banc); Glazner v. Glazner, 347 F.3d 1212, 1216 
(11th Cir. 2003) (en banc); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 575 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 535 U.S. 
722 (2002); Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 230 F.3d 461, 
467 (1st Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 543 U.S. 481 
(2005); Coats v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 61 F.3d 1113, 
1137-38 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc); McKinney v. Pate, 20 
F.3d 1550, 1565 n.21 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc). 
We also consider three factors unique to courts of 
appeals. First, prior en banc decisions carry more stare 
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decisis weight than prior panel decisions. See United 
States v. Games-Perez, 695 F.3d 1104, 1124 (10th Cir. 
2012) (Gorsuch, J., dissental) (“[I]t is surely 
uncontroversial to suggest that the point of the en banc 
process, the very reason for its existence, is to correct 
grave errors in panel precedents when they become 
apparent, even if the panel precedents in question happen 
to be old or involve questions of statutory or regulatory 
interpretation.”); Igartua v. United States, 654 F.3d 99, 
100 (1st Cir. 2011) (statement of Lynch, C.J., and Boudin 
& Howard, JJ.) (declining “to reopen settled issues which 
have already been given en banc treatment”); McKinney, 
20 F.3d at 1565 n.21 (“It must be recalled that this is the 
first time this court sitting en banc has addressed this issue; 
thus, the implications of stare decisis are less weighty than 
if we were overturning a precedent established by the court 
en banc.”). See generally Letter from Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor to Ret. Justice Byron R. White (June 23, 1998), 
published in Review of the Report by the Commission on 
Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals 
Regarding the Ninth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit 
Reorganization Act: Hearing on S. 253 Before the 
Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight & the Courts of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 71 (1999) 
[hereinafter Ninth Circuit Review] (“It is important to the 
federal system as a whole that the Courts of Appeals utilize 
en banc review to correct panel errors within the circuit 
that are likely to otherwise come before the Supreme 
Court.”); Letter from Justice Antonin Scalia to Ret. Justice 
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Byron R. White (Aug. 21, 1998), published in Ninth 
Circuit Review 72 (“[T]he function of en banc hearings . . 
. is not only to eliminate intra-circuit conflicts, but also to 
correct and deter panel opinions that are pretty clearly 
wrong. . . . The disproportionate segment of [the Supreme 
Court’s] discretionary docket that is consistently devoted 
to reviewing [a court of appeals’s] judgments, and to 
reversing them by lop-sided margins, suggests that this 
error-reduction function is not being performed 
effectively.”). 
Second, “[w]hile we generally ‘decide cases before us 
based on our own examination of the issue, not on the 
views of other jurisdictions,’ the[] more recent [contrary] 
decisions [from other circuits] suggest that we should 
‘consider whether the reasoning applied by our colleagues 
elsewhere is persuasive.’” Bastardo-Vale v. Attorney 
Gen., 934 F.3d 255, 267 (3d Cir. 2019) (en banc) (quoting 
In re Grossman’s Inc., 607 F.3d 114, 121 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(en banc)); see also United States v. Corner, 598 F.3d 411, 
414 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“Although . . . it is rarely 
appropriate to overrule circuit precedent just to move from 
one side of a [circuit] conflict to another, reconsideration 
is more appropriate when [we] can eliminate the conflict 
by overruling a decision that lacks support elsewhere.”); 
cf. Wagner v. PennWest Farm Credit, ACA, 109 F.3d 909, 
912 (3d Cir. 1997) (“In light of such an array of 
[unanimous] precedent [from other courts of appeals], we 
would require a compelling basis to hold otherwise before 
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effecting a circuit split.”); Butler Cty. Mem’l Hosp. v. 
Heckler, 780 F.2d 352, 357 (3d Cir. 1985) (“[T]his Court 
should be reluctant to contradict the unanimous position 
of other circuits.”). 
Third, “on rare occasions a circuit precedent, though 
not directly overruled or superseded, nonetheless might 
crumble” if “case law postdating ‘the original decision, 
although not directly controlling, nevertheless offers a 
sound reason for believing that the former panel, in light 
of fresh developments, would change its collective 
mind.’” Stewart, 230 F.3d at 467 (quoting Williams v. 
Ashland Eng’g Co., 45 F.3d 588, 592 (1st Cir. 1995)). 
All three factors support overturning Graziano. Given 
Lamie and other recent Supreme Court decisions, we 
believe the panel that decided Graziano would decide it 
differently today. And what’s more, Graziano was only a 
panel decision; our en banc Court has never expressed a 
view on the issue presented. By expressing our view today, 
we put an end to a circuit split and restore national 
uniformity to the meaning of § 1692g. 
Traditional stare decisis considerations point in the 
same direction. For starters, district courts applying 
Graziano have split over whether identical language 
violates its rule. See Cadillo v. Stoneleigh Recovery 
Assocs., LLC, No. 17-7472, 2019 WL 1091391, at *4 
(D.N.J. Mar. 8, 2019) (collecting cases), appeal docketed, 
19-2811 (3d Cir. Aug. 8, 2019). 
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Additionally, “the growth of judicial doctrine” has 
undermined Graziano’s reasoning. Patterson v. McClean 
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989), superseded on 
other grounds by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Jones v. R.R. 
Donnelly & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 383 (2004). Recall 
how Graziano framed its own conclusion: “subsection 
(a)(3) . . . contemplates that any dispute, to be effective, 
must be in writing.” 950 F.2d at 112 (emphasis added). 
That is a curious verb choice, since it suggests the panel 
thought § 1692g(a)(3) meant something other than what it 
says. See, e.g., Contemplate, Oxford English Dictionary 
(2d ed. 1989) (“To have in view, look for, expect, take into 
account as a contingency to be provided for. To have in 
view as a purpose; to intend, purpose.”). 
But that is not how we read statutes today. In the years 
before Graziano, the Supreme Court engaged in statutory 
interpretation with statements like, “[a]bsent a clearly 
expressed legislative intention to the contrary, th[e 
statutory] language must ordinarily be regarded as 
conclusive.” Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE 
Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) (emphasis 
added). In the years since Graziano, the Court has 
instructed us “that [the] legislature says . . . what it means 
and means . . . what it says.” Henson v. Santander 
Consumer USA Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1725 (2017) 
(alteration and omissions in original) (quoting Dodd v. 
United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357 (2005)). In other words, 
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“[a]s Justice Kagan recently stated, ‘we’re all textualists 
now.’” Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory 
Interpretation, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118, 2118 (2016) 
(reviewing Robert A. Katzmann, Judging Statutes (2014)) 
(quoting Justice Elena Kagan, The Scalia Lecture: A 
Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the Reading of Statutes at 
8:28 (Nov. 17, 2015), http://perma.cc/BCF-FEFR). We 
decline to breathe new life into Graziano’s atextual 
interpretation of § 1692g(a)(3), an interpretation that has 
already made us the “legal last-man-standing” among the 
courts of appeals. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2411. 
Moreover, any legitimate reliance interests seem 
minimal. Overturning Graziano merely requires debt 
collectors to prospectively tweak their collection notice 
template. If anything, since debt collectors may operate 
nationwide, overturning Graziano should make their job 
easier by allowing them to use the same form no matter 
where a debtor resides. By contrast, resuscitating 
Graziano would mean collectors must use one notice in 
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, and the Virgin 
Islands, but another everywhere else. And overturning 
Graziano helps debtors too, since the case’s atextual rule 
requires more than the statutory text mandates for them to 
dispute a debt’s validity. See supra note 3 and 
accompanying text. 
*      *      * 
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By today’s standards, Graziano’s “reasoning was 
clearly wrong”; changes in the way we interpret statutes 
“have unmoored the case from its doctrinal anchors.” 
Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 180 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(Smith, J., concurring). Both traditional stare decisis 
principles and considerations unique to courts of appeals 
convince us that Graziano should be, and now is, 
overruled. 
IV 
Perhaps anticipating the result we announce today, 
Riccio asks us to curb our holding’s retroactive application 
so that Graziano still governs her claim. Her only support 
for that argument is New Jersey precedent allowing state-
court judges to limit a holding’s retroactive application 
“when ‘considerations of fairness and justice, related to 
reasonable surprise and prejudice to those affected’ 
counsel [them] to do so.” Malinowski v. Jacobs, 915 A.2d 
513, 517 (N.J. 2007) (quoting N.J. Election Law Enf’t 
Comm’n v. Citizens to Make Mayor–Council Gov’t Work, 
526 A.2d 1069, 1073 (N.J. 1987)). 
Yet federal courts follow a different rule. Our holding 
today “is the controlling interpretation of federal law and 
must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open 
on direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether 
such events predate or postdate our announcement of the 
rule.” Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 
(1993). “[W]e can scarcely permit ‘the substantive law [to] 
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shift and spring’ according to ‘the particular equities of 
[individual parties’] claims’ of actual reliance on an old 
rule and of harm from a retroactive application of the new 
rule.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting James B. Beam 
Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 543 (1991) 
(opinion of Souter, J.)). We will, therefore, apply to this 
case our new rule that debt collectors need not require 
debtors to dispute the validity of their debt in writing.5 
 
 
5 We do not suggest that debt collectors who sent 
Graziano-compliant letters before today will be on the 
hook for failing to foresee our change in the law. Just as 
collectors who act “in good faith in conformity with any 
[agency] advisory opinion” cannot be liable if that 
“opinion is amended, rescinded, or” judicially invalidated, 
§ 1692k(e), collectors should not be penalized for good-
faith compliance with then-governing caselaw. To that 
end, we note district courts can withhold damages for 
unintentional errors, § 1692k(b), award no damages for 
trivial violations, § 1692k(a)(1), and even award 
attorney’s fees to the collector if the debtor’s suit “was 
brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment,” 
§ 1692k(a)(3). See generally Jerman v. Carlisle, 
McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573, 597-
99 (2010). We have confidence in district courts to 




Our new rule dooms Riccio’s claim. As we and several 
other Circuits have held, debt collection notices must 
intelligibly convey the § 1692g(a) requirements. See 
Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 354-55 (3d Cir. 
2000) (collecting cases). Put another way, a hypothetical 
“least sophisticated debtor” should be able to read the 
notice and reasonably discern her rights. Id.; cf. United 
States v. Nat’l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131, 136 (4th Cir. 
1996) (noting the least sophisticated debtor standard “also 
prevents liability for bizarre or idiosyncratic 
interpretations of collection notices by preserving a 
quotient of reasonableness and presuming a basic level of 
understanding and willingness to read with care”).6 
Sentry Credit’s collection notice easily clears that bar. 
Its plainspoken language reproduces § 1692g(a)(3)–(5) 
nearly word-for-word, alerting the least sophisticated 
debtor of her rights as effectively as does the statute itself. 
 
6 Although Judge Matey reaches the same conclusion as 
the Court, it is his view that the atextual “least 
sophisticated debtor” test announced in Graziano warrants 
reexamination. See Jensen v. Pressler & Pressler, 791 
F.3d 413, 418 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting that the “least 
sophisticated debtor” requirement “appears nowhere in the 
text of the statute”). In his view, in an appropriate case, we 
should revisit whether that standard comports with the 
ordinary meaning of the FDCPA. 
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A collection notice can never mislead the least 
sophisticated debtor by relying on the language Congress 
chose. And since that’s all this notice did, Sentry Credit 
did not violate § 1692g. 
VI 
In short, we conclude that debt collection notices sent 
under § 1692g need not require that disputes be expressed 
in writing. In doing so, we overrule Graziano’s contrary 
holding. Because Sentry Credit’s notice perfectly tracked 
§ 1692g’s text, we will affirm the judgment of the District 
Court. 
